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Kamis, 28 Juni 2012

FATF Public Statement

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from ML/FT risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.


Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks emanating from the jurisdictions*.

Iran
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies** The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction, as described below.

Bolivia
Cuba**
Ethiopia
Kenya
Myanmar
Sri Lanka
Syria
Turkey


* The FATF has previously issued public statements calling for counter-measures on Iran and DPRK. Those statements are updated below.
**Cuba has not engaged with the FATF in the process.


Iran

The FATF remains concerned by Iran’s failure to meaningfully address the on-going and substantial deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF remains particularly concerned about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges Iran to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, in particular by criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing suspicious transaction reporting (STR) requirements.

The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2009 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran. FATF continues to urge jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. If Iran fails to take concrete steps to improve its AML/CFT regime, the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to strengthen counter-measures in October 2011.

Cuba

Cuba has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it constructively engaged with the FATF. The FATF has identified Cuba as having strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system. The FATF urges Cuba to develop an AML/CFT regime in line with international standards, and is ready to work with the Cuban authorities to this end.

Bolivia

Despite Bolivia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should work on addressing these deficiencies including by: (1) ensuring adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Ethiopia

Despite Ethiopia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Ethiopia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Ethiopia should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework and procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Ethiopia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Kenya

Despite Kenya’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Kenya has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Kenya should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Kenya to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by implementing the AML legislation and operationalising the new AML Advisory Board.

Myanmar

Myanmar has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by clarifying the scope of the ML offence. Despite Myanmar’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Myanmar has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Myanmar should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) further strengthening the extradition framework in relation to terrorist financing (Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I); (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (5) enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); and (6) strengthening customer due diligence measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages Myanmar to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Sri Lanka

Despite Sri Lanka’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Sri Lanka has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Sri Lanka should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); and (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Sri Lanka to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Syria

Syria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the ML and TF offences. Despite Syria’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain Syria should work on addressing its deficiencies, including by: (1) adopting adequate measures to implement and enforce the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (Special Recommendation I); (2) implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring financial institutions are aware of and comply with their obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to ML and FT (Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV); and (4) ensuring appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance (Recommendations 36-38, Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Syria to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Turkey

Turkey has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by working on CFT legislation. Despite Turkey’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Turkey has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Turkey should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Turkey to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Source: FATF

Selasa, 26 Juni 2012

JP Morgan pays $88.5m to settle sanction violations

JP Morgan Chase has agreed with the US Treasury Department to pay $88.3m (£54.2m) to avoid liability for "apparent violations" of sanctions against Cuba, Sudan, Liberia and Iran.

The Treasury said such violations, which took place between March 2005 and March 2011, were "egregious".

These included processing 1,711 transfers totalling $178.5m to Cubans in contravention of US regulations.

JP Morgan said there had been no intention to violate regulations.

"The firm screens hundreds of millions of transaction and customer records per day, and annual error rates are a tiny fraction of 1%," said Jennifer Zuccarelli, a spokeswoman for the bank.

"We are pleased to have resolved these matters and to move forward with enhancements to our [foreign assets] compliance programme."

JP Morgan reported net profits of $5.4bn for the three months to 30 June, up from $4.8bn a year earlier.

Source: BBC

Selasa, 19 Juni 2012

US maintains Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria on terror sponsors' list

The US has retained Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list nations which allegedly sponsor of terrorism.

The State Department retained these four countries in this list after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton determined that the government of these nations has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

As a result, these countries would face a wide range of sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales; controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; prohibitions on economic assistance and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982, the Government of Cuba maintained a public stance against terrorism and terrorist financing in 2010, but there was no evidence that it had severed ties with elements from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty continue to reside in Cuba, the State Department said.

Iran, designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2010.

Tehran's financial, material, and logistic support for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of democracy, it said.

In 2010, Iran remained the principal supporter of groups implacably opposed to the Middle East Peace Process, it added. Sudan, which was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993, the State Department said remained a cooperative partner in global counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaida in 2010.

During the past year, the Government of Sudan worked actively to counter AQ operations that posed a potential threat to US interests and personnel in Sudan.

Sudanese officials have indicated that they viewed continued cooperation to the US as important and recognized the potential benefits of American training and information-sharing.

Syria was designated as the State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979. In 2010, it continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, the report said.

The State Department said Syria provided political and weapons support to Hizballah in Lebanon and allowed Iran to resupply the terrorist organization with weapons.

The external leadership of Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, among others, were based in Damascus and operated within Syria's borders.

Statements supporting terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah consistently permeated government speeches and press statements, it said.